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Fisher & Ury claim that an important step in 
resolving a dispute is to be aware of one’s BATNA 
– what alternative parties have if negotiation 
fails. Providing accurate information is impor-
tant, because disputing parties have a tendency 
to develop an overoptimistic view on their posi-
tion in the dispute. The ‘reactive devaluation’ 
effect suggests that advice given by one’s oppo-
nent is less likely to be taken into account than 
the same information provided by a neutral. As 
Information Technology can be perceived as a 
neutral party, providing online BATNA calcula-
tion may be a useful extension to the ADR/ODR 
toolbox. 
However, in order to determine BATNAs online, 
we need a proper understanding of exactly what 
is a BATNA. This paper argues that current under-
standing of what comprises BATNAs is insuffi-
cient for the intended purposes.
1. Introduction
Lawyers have been very slow, compared to other 
professionals, in the adoption of Information 
Technology (IT). Although still relatively low, IT 
use by the judiciary and other legal professionals 
is growing (e.g., Oskamp, Lodder & Apistola 
2004). IT has also a role to play in helping par-
t ies resolve disputes . Not only are lega l 
knowledge-based systems appearing as tools that 
provide legal advice to the disputing parties,2 
but also there are numerous systems that (help) 
settle disputes in an online environment. They 
are emerging in research labs and in the market 
place and are defined as Online Dispute Resolu-
tion (ODR) services (e.g., Katsh & Rifkin 2001; 
Kaufmann-Kohler & Schultz 2004).3 
ODR systems are currently, primarily, systems 
that belong to the class of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR).4 These systems rely on In-
formation and Communications Technology to 
support the resolution of disputes out of court, 
typically in an online environment. A well-
known, and fairly popular5 example is Squar–
etrade, an ODR service affiliated to eBay6 that 
provides an environment for direct negotiation 
and mediation. This system has handled over 1 
million cases to date.7 Another successful ODR 
example is CyberSettle, a company providing a 
blind bidding service that has settled over 
100.000 monetary disputes to date.8 In a blind 
bidding procedure, or automated negotiation, 
parties settle monetary disputes by submitting 
confidential offers and demands to a system that 
settles the issue by deciding upon the median 
amount as long as both bids come within a 
predetermined settlement range.9
Most of the current research and developments 
in ODR focus on facilitating the dispute resolu-
tion process: for instance, the provision of tools 
and techniques that assist parties in creating 
settlement proposals10 and even tools that to 
some extent decide certain issues by means of 
techniques, such as blind bidding.
An aspect that has received relatively little atten-
tion in ODR research is an examination of what 
decisions people have to make when they are 
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procedure itself, and hence take place on a meta 
level when compared to the actual resolution of 
the dispute, are influenced by what happens in 
the dispute, but they are also partly influenced 
by factors outside of the dispute. Disputants 
make choices pertaining to issues, such as the 
type of procedure to adopt, whether to stop or 
proceed with a procedure, and the techniques to 
be used (such as blind bidding). Improving the 
quality of these decisions is important, because a 
badly considered decision may lead to an out-
come that is worse, induces higher costs and/or 
more emotional discomfort. The support of 
professionals to help disputants make the right 
choices with respect to the dispute resolution 
process may contribute to the effectiveness and 
efficiency of ODR, as it helps people to deter-
mine whether ODR is a useful process for re-
solving the dispute. 
In this paper we focus on the need to provide 
the parties in the dispute with proper informa-
tion to make informed choices. This includes 
information, or knowledge, about issues, such 
as, the legal merits of a case, a party's own and 
their adversary's interests, information on the 
available methods for resolving conflicts, and 
the possible outcomes of these procedures. This 
knowledge will enable parties to make better 
judgements on their options and chances in a 
conflict. A well-known example of this kind of 
knowledge is Fisher & Ury’s (1981, pp. 97-106) 
concept of the ‘Best Alternative to a Negotiated 
Agreement’ (BATNA). They say that negotiators 
need to have an understanding of their options 
outside the process of negotiation, such as re-
sorting to a court procedure, as it enables them 
to compare proposals made in the negotiation 
process with the best alternative outside the 
negotiation process. Although many scholars 
refer to the importance of developing a BATNA 
(e.g., Raiffa 1982, p. 45; Neale & Bazerman 1991, 
pp. 18-19; Pruitt & Carnevale 1993, p. 17; Raiffa 
et al. 2002, p. 110; Lewicki et al. 2003, p. 9), a 
precise notion of what constitutes a BATNA, is 
not available. Fisher & Ury refrain from giving a 
definition and prefer to talk about the concept 
in terms of examples. As our aim is to offer 
computer support with respect to the choices in 
the resolution process, which includes estab-
lishing the parties BATNAs, such an intuitive 
notion is inadequate for the task at hand. 
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section II, 
starts with a brief discussion of the concept of a 
BATNA and why it is important to support 
parties in developing their BATNA. Next, in 
Section III we argue that determining BATNAs 
by means of a computer program is useful. In 
Section IV we argue that the use of IT to provide 
advice about BATNAs needs a more thorough 
understanding of the concept of a BATNA than 
is currently available. Section V concludes the 
discussion.
2. The Need for a Reality Test Provided 
by a Neutral
2.1 A closer look at the BATNA concept
In their seminal book ‘Getting to Yes’ Fisher & 
Ury (1981) introduce the BATNA concept as a 
tool for negotiators to cope with power imbal-
ances, e.g. one party may have a stronger bar-
gaining position, or more (financial) resources 
than her opponent. They claim that, if negotia-
tors do take account of their options outside a 
negotiation, they are better protected against 
agreements that should be rejected. It also helps 
them to reach agreements that better satisfy 
their interests (Fisher & Ury 1981, p. 97). In 
order to assess whether an offer should be re-
jected, a party in a dispute has to establish what 
can be accomplished in alternative procedures to 
the one currently being conducted. This may 
include exiting the procedure altogether, or 
handing over the case to a court. Once the alter-
natives are known, these can be compared to 
what one expects to win by accepting an offer in 
the current procedure. If the proposal is worse 
than the (best) alternative outside the proce-
dure, it should be rejected; if it is better it should 
be considered for acceptance. In this respect 
each party's BATNA serves as a point of refer-
ence or a value with which to compare offers 
(Raiffa et al. 2002, p. 112). 
The second reason why knowing one’s BATNA is 
important, is that it influences negotiation 
power. Parties who are aware of their alterna-
tives will be more confident about trying to 
negotiate a solution that better serves their 
interests (Fisher & Ury, p. 102). When trying to 













































knowing what other car salesmen (or even indi-
viduals) offer or have offered for your (or a 
similar) car, helps in obtaining a reasonable 
price for your vehicle. 
The BATNA concept is a useful metaphor in all 
dispute resolution procedures where parties 
have the option to exit the process, such as ne-
gotiation and mediation. A BATNA in this sense 
is a way to put pressure on the other party. If 
terminating the process has advantages over 
accepting the other party's offer, it should be an 
incentive to continue the negotiation, else if the 
other party is unwilling to reconsider the offer, 
walking out is a very sensible option. 
BATNAs not only serve a purpose in evaluating 
offers in the dispute, they can also play a role in 
determining whether or not to accept a certain 
dispute resolution method. In a recent article, 
Mnookin (2003) wrote that having an accurate 
BATNA is part of the armoury one should use to 
evaluate whether or not to agree to enter a ne-
gotiation. We believe this to hold for many dis-
pute resolution methods, including arbitration 
and mediation, but also for tools and techniques 
within these methods, such as (blind) bidding, 
persuasion dialogues, and final offer arbitration. 
Comparing the possible (range of ) outcomes 
with alternative options encourages parties to 
accept methods that are in the interests of dis-
putants and enables them to identify those that 
are not. It is likely that most parties, to some 
extent, test the values of their BATNAs when 
assessing whether or not to opt for a certain 
dispute resolution method.
Although BATNAs are an important aspect of 
the dispute resolution, there is reason to believe 
that parties engaged in actual disputes are not 
very good at determining their BATNAs
2.1 Optimistic Overconfidence
A large body of research shows that people have 
a tendency to develop an overly optimistic view 
on their chances in disputes (e.g., Neale and 
Bazerman 1991, pp. 53-55; Kahneman & Tver-
sky 1995, pp. 46-50; Baron 2000, p. 367; Lewicki 
et al 2003, p. 157; Korobkin 2005). This process 
is referred to as ‘optimistic overconfidence’, 
because disputants have unrealistic optimistic 
expectations about the validity of their judge-
ments (Lewicki et al 2003, p. 157). Neale and 
Bazerman (1983), for instance, showed this 
effect. In their (laboratory) experiment, both 
parties were asked to submit a final offer to an 
arbitrator.11 The participants were told that the 
arbitrator had to choose one of the offers. The 
experiment showed that the disputants, on aver-
age, believed to have a 65.4 percent chance of 
getting their final offer accepted, while on aver-
age their real chance of success is 50 percent. 
This experiment suggests that people systemati-
cally overestimate their probability of success in 
dispute resolution.
This effect of overestimating one’s position is 
present with respect to predicting outcomes of 
current situations as well as future events. These 
valuations and predictions influence how dis-
putants calculate their BATNAs. The conse-
quence of overly optimistic BATNAs is that a 
generous offer in a negotiation, or an offer to 
start a procedure that is in the interest of a party, 
is prone to be rejected. One of the likely sources 
of the overconfidence effect is that people find it 
hard to move from earlier positions (Pruitt & 
Carnevale 1993, p. 33). They strongly adhere to 
positions taken and are more likely to actively 
collect information that confirms the validity of 
their position, and they downplay or ignore 
information that refutes their choice. Howard 
Raiffa (2002, p. 36) calls this the ‘Confirming 
Evidence Trap’. Phenomena, such as optimistic 
overconfidence, are rooted in the psychological 
make up of people, and should be taken into 
account when trying to build dispute resolution 
tools.
The consequence of the optimistic overconfi-
dence effect is that people regularly support 
positions or options that are incorrect (Lewicki 
et al. 2003, p. 157). People with overoptimistic 
BATNAs may reject procedures and proposals 
that might actually be in their interest. The 
effect on proposals is rather straightforward 
(tough luck, you ignored an excellent bargain), 
but the effect of not accepting certain proce-
dures needs some explanation. An obvious 
alternative to accepting an offer to opt for an 
alternative dispute resolution method, such as 
arbitration or mediation, is to resort to a court 
proceeding. Many people think court proceed-








































overly optimistic disputant may conclude that 
he or she is better off in court, than opting for a 
more cooperative procedure, such as mediation 
or negotiation. The cooperative procedure in 
this case is perceived as less attractive, because in 
such a procedure it is normal that both parties 
make concessions (see also Barendrecht & De 
Vries 2004, pp. 23-24). Our overoptimistic dis-
putant will be reluctant to make concessions if 
she thinks she will surely be able to obtain eve-
rything she desires in court. 
To limit the chances of optimistic overconfi-
dence causing poor decision-making, it may be 
useful to provide the disputing parties with 
something one may call a ‘reality test’ of their 
BATNA. Who, or what, should provide this real-
ity check? 
2.2 Why neutrality is important: Reac-
tive Devaluation
There are not that many possible sources for a 
reality check on BATNAs. To address it from a 
slightly different angle, who are those capable of 
presenting objective BATNAs. Obviously, the 
opponent appears not to be a suitable candidate 
as she has a vested interest in her own position 
or offer. Alternatively, actors sympathising with 
the person seeking advice may also not be too 
suited as they may fall into the same, or similar, 
traps as the information seeker. This leaves only 
a neutral party as a candidate.12 
Neutrality is an important value in any dispute 
resolution system. This has to do with the no-
tion of fairness. In a court proceeding, the par-
ties should be able to express their side of their 
case, and the judge should assess the arguments 
in an unbiased manner. This same lack of bias is 
the reason why neutrality is also of importance 
in other dispute resolution systems, such as ADR 
and ODR. 
But fairness is not the only reason for providing 
advice on the realism of BATNAs by a neutral 
party. From a cognitive psychology perspective 
neutrality is valuable. People have the tendency 
to devalue information given by parties or or-
ganizations they perceive as adversaries. In the 
literature this psychological process is called 
‘reactive devaluation’ and is supported by several 
empirical studies (e.g., Neale & Bazerman, p. 75; 
Ross 1995, pp. 29-38). One of the explanations 
for this phenomenon is that parties lack infor-
mation about the interests and intentions of the 
other party. This lack of insight in the interests 
of others induces a kind of distrust in their 
opinions (we are talking of parties that are 
already in a dispute and hence a lack of trust in 
the opponent’s statements is inevitable) and the 
proposals the opponent presents. The idea that a 
proposal made by the opponent, naturally, 
benefits this person, is easily accepted. 
The effect of the reactive devaluation process is 
that advice given by the opponent is not judged 
as 'neutral' advice. Therefore it is useful that 
someone or something that is perceived as neu-
tral to both parties provides negotiation advice 
about BATNAs.
The ODR technology can, at least under certain 
conditions, play the role of such a neutral party, 
and hence could in principle be considered as an 
instrument to provide advice about the realism 
of BATNAs13. The neutrality of the ODR tech-
nology may be jeopardized by non-technical 
circumstances, such as organizational ties to one 
of the parties and it may be enhanced by, for 
instance, a seal of approval of a consumer 
organization.14
If indeed the technology is capable of assessing, 
or establishing objective BATNAs, then it could 
supplement ODR technologies in a useful way.
3. The Promise of Online Negotiation 
Advise
3.1 Focus on the Shadow of the Law
BATNAs have been explored in the context of 
online dispute resolution systems, although, as 
previously mentioned, not to a large extent. As 
most negotiations take place in the shadow of 
the law, an important aspect of BATNA advice is 
to know what might be the results of a court 
procedure. This is the context used in two pro-
jects addressing the establishment of BATNAs by 
computer programs.
Split-Up, a system that advises on property dis-
tribution following divorce (Zeleznikow & Stra-
nieri 1995), gives its users an insight into the 
likely outcomes of a court procedure. The ap-
proach used in this project was to identify rele-













































der Australian family law. Ninety-four variables 
were identified as relevant for a determination 
in consultation with experts. The way the factors 
combine was not elicited from experts as rules 
or complex formulas. Rather, values on the 94 
variables were extracted from cases previously 
decided. The Split-Up system was able to learn 
how the variables related to each other by using 
Knowledge Discovery from Databases (KDD). 
KDD is particularly suited to the discovery of 
knowledge in discretionary domains. The re-
sulting Split Up system was capable of deciding 
new cases in a similar manner to which judges 
decided the cases used in the Split Up training 
set. 
The knowledge available in Split Up can be used 
to establish BATNAs. The way this works is that 
the system first shows both litigants what they 
can expect to be awarded by a court if their 
claims are accepted. It gives them relevant advice 
as to what will happen if some or all of their 
claims are rejected. The Split-up system can also 
provide information about hypothetical situa-
tions, for instance what the effect on the prop-
erty distribution will be if one of the parties is 
given the custody of the children.
On the basis of the example provided by Bel-
lucci and Zeleznikow (2001), we can imagine the 
following situation. The claims of two dispu-
tants, husband (H) and wife (W) are entered 
into the Split-Up system. The system then pre-
dicts the outcome a judge will decide upon with 
respect to the distribution of marital assets over 
the parties. These outcomes can be considered 
as the extreme positions.
W’s% H’s %
Wife's claims are honoured 65 35
Husband's claims are hon-
oured
42 58
Table 1. Use of Split-Up to provide predictions 
on the distribution of marital assets
Table 1 shows, for instance, that if the Wife's 
claims are all honoured, her ex-husband will 
receive 35% of the martial assets, whereas she 
will get the remaining 65%. However, as the 
parties in our dispute are unaware of the 
chances of getting their claims rewarded, this 
table in itself does not provide complete BAT-
NAs. Suppose that the wife proposes the fol-
lowing distribution of assets:
W’s% H’s %
Wife's proposal, including 
her getting custody over 
the children
60 40
Table 2. Use of Split-Up to provide negotiation 
advice
The proposal includes as a condition that she 
receives custody over the children. If the hus-
band thinks he has a lower than 50% chance of 
winning a court procedure, and given that he 
has access to the BATNAs provided by the Split-
Up system, he would be well advised to accept 
40% of the common pool (otherwise he would 
also risk paying large legal fees and having on-
going conflict).
Another project that focuses on assessing the 
possible outcomes of litigation, is the BEST 
project - Batna Establishment using Semantic 
web Technology.15 The legal domain of this 
project is damages disputes, which concerns a 
substantial number of court cases. This project 
is still in its infancy, as it only commenced in 
early 2005. The project will provide litigants 
with information about the outcome of proce-
dures, through intelligent disclosure of case-law 
using Semantic Web technology. In Best, BAT-
NAs are constructed by extrapolating and com-
bining the actual outcomes of similar cases to 
the case at hand on the fly. The cases in the case 
database are used as predictors for new cases. 
Whereas Split-up uses a (static) explicit domain 
specific decision model constructed on the basis 
of an analysis of previous cases, BEST uses an 
approach that relies on finding decided cases 
similar to the case at hand, without having an 
explicit decision model. A BATNA in Split-up 
can be said to be an application of the rules in 
its knowledge base to the case at hand. A BATNA 
in Best consist of the outcome of the case that 
best matches the characteristics of the case at 










































These projects are examples of some results and 
promising outlooks in determining BATNAs. 
Since most negotiations take place in the 
shadow of the law, an important aspect of 
BATNA advice is to understand the potential 
results of a court procedure. Outcomes are im-
portant, but other factors are also relevant for 
deciding whether or not to opt for a certain 
procedure or to accept a proposal in a proce-
dure. 
5. Why an enhanced Understanding of 
BATNAs is needed
We want to help parties to develop BATNAs 
through the use of online tools that operate 
without the intervention of a human third party. 
Hence it is important to know what elements are 
useful for constructing a BATNA that is accurate 
enough to provide useful advice. Such a scenario 
provides for a different context than one that 
makes use of a human mediator or advisor. The 
human agent can, on an ad hoc basis, decide 
which elements are relevant. The flexibility 
exhibited by human agents in judging or evalu-
ating what is present, is largely lacking in the 
kind of tools we envision. We therefore need to 
have algorithms that rely on a (relatively) precise 
notion of what constitutes a BATNA. 
Fisher and Ury (1981) focussed upon Outcome 
in their original discussion of BATNAs. The 
Split Up system and the Best project focus upon 
predictions with respect to the likelihood of a 
particular outcome in a court case. What is not 
taken into account, are factors that relate to the 
effort and risks involved in pursuing the various 
options. These factors play a role in determining 
whether it is wise to accept a particular offer. 
An open research question is what the relevant 
factors are that play a role in determining the 






The outcome is the decision in a court or arbi-
tration, the agreement in a negotiation or me-
diation or the status quo situation if the alter-
native is walking away from the negotiation 
table or the dispute resolution process. When 
considering the outcome, we should probably, as 
in the Split Up case, take into account the par-
ties' preferences and also the likelihood of 
meeting certain goals or interests (in the view of 
the other party, for instance).
The risk can be modelled as the likelihood of 
obtaining a specific outcome. 
The time is the duration of the whole (alterna-
tive) dispute resolution process. The expected 
timeframe of the conflict warrants consideration 
as a distinct entity in the BATNA equation as it 
captures some of the emotional aspects associ-
ated with the uncertainty with respect to the 
chances of resolving the conflict. This may espe-
cially be true for non-commercial disputants. 
Cost and benefits are important factors, as most 
disputants will have limited resources. Costs 
may include the costs of the neutral, the costs of 
help by advisers such as lawyers, the costs of 
experts, the opportunity costs of the time spent, 
and the costs of uncertainty. The (range of pos-
sible) outcome(s) may be a benefit or a cost, 
depending on whether the outcome is an im-
provement or a loss compared to the status quo, 
the situation before the resolution process 
started. Although modelling these factors in 
terms of monetary values is useful, there may be 
reasons to represent some factors using other 
metrics. 
Whether these are the factors we should con-
sider and how these factors weigh and interre-
late, is an open question. Avoiding risk, for 
instance, is an important element of negotiation 
and one that needs to be considered when de-
veloping BATNAs. A BATNA, which would re-
quire a high risk to be obtained (in terms of 
costs or time), may be less acceptable than a low 
risk BATNA.
The above is a far from complete rendering of 
what comprises a BATNA. There are many other 
open questions to resolve. For instance:
• are BATNAs domain specific (e.g. the Split Up 
factors), or is it possible to devise mechanisms 
that provide advice on BATNAs without 
domain knowledge about the dispute? 
• are BATNAs legal system specific, or can 













































used for Australian family law disputes as 
well?
• what is the role of disputants becoming more 
aware of the underlying evidence (through 
dialogues with their opponents) on their 
BATNA?
• what are the differences between the BATNAs 
with respect to making choices regarding 
offers made by the opponent in a negotiation 
and the choice with respect to methods and 
tools to further the dispute resolution proc-
ess? 
• is outcome in the sense as described above, 
the defining feature of a BATNA, or are (per-
ceived and real) time, cost, effort and risk 
much more relevant factors?
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have discussed some problems 
people face in determining BATNAs on the basis 
of 'shortcomings' in their cognitive make-up. 
We have also argued that, if we want to use 
BATNAs to offer disputants better advice on 
whether they should accept an offer made by 
their opponent, or proceed to litigation, we need 
a better understanding of what is a BATNA. The 
questions outlined above show that we are only 
at the beginning of grasping a better under-
standing of BATNAs. Yet, in order to provide 
people with useful tools to support their online 
dispute resolution, we need to have a better 
understanding of the mechanisms and factors 
that are relevant in making decisions within and 
about the procedure. Otherwise, designing 
computer support for establishing BATNAs will 
either be a case-by-case affair, or at best, be a 
very difficult task.
Whilst having an accurate BATNA is important, 
it does in itself not resolve the dispute. In nego-
tiations and mediation, whether online or 
offline, we still need to try to ensure that parties 
focus on their interests and encourage parties to 
seek creative solutions to their dispute.
Notes
1. Berend de Vries, LL.M. is a research fellow at 
TILT, the Tilburg Institute for Law, Technol-
ogy, and Society of Tilburg University, The 
Netherlands. Dr. Ronald Leenes is an associ-
ate professor of IT, Law and Public admini-
stration at TILT. Dr. John Zeleznikow is a 
professor of Information systems and di-
rector of the Donald Berman Research Unit 
for IT and Law, International Corporate 
Governance Research Institute, at Victoria 
University, Australia.
2. See for instance how Zeleznikow (2003) has 
used legal decision support systems to offer 
advice that will increase access to justice. 
The Economist March 12 2005, in an article 
AI and the law, Economist Technology 
Quarterly, pp. 21-22, comments upon this 
trend.
3. For an extensive overview of the literature 
o n O D R , s e e t h e O D R L i b r a r y a t 
www.odr.info.
4. We follow the approach of the American 
Arbitration Association’s Task Force on E-
commerce and ADR that define ODR as ‘a 
broad term that encompasses many forms of 
ADR and court proceedings that incorpo-
rate the use of the Internet, websites, email 
communications, streaming media and 
other information technology as part of the 
dispute resolution process’. This definition 
also includes the use of online technologies 
in courts; see Kaufmann-Kohler & Schultz 
(2004, pp. 5-7).
5. For recent figures see Conley Tyler (2004) 
and Kaufmann-Kohler & Schultz (2004).
6. e B a y i s a n o n l i n e a u c t i o n s i t e , s e e 
<www.ebay.com>.
7. See <www.squaretrade.com>, last visited 
April 2005.
8. See <www.cybersettle.com>, last visited 
April 2005.
9. This range is often 20 or 30%. See also 
Kaufmann-Kohler & Schultz (2004, pp. 17-
21) and Katsh & Rifkin (2001, pp. 61-62).
10. An example of a system that does help 
reaching (better) agreements is SmartSettle, 
<www.smartsettle.com>. Part of the Smart-
Settle process is the automated generation of 
improved settlement proposals. See Thiesen 
& McMahon (2000) for a detailed discussion 
of the SmartSettle process, which used to be 
called ‘One Accord’.
11. This is an exist ing dispute resolution 
method cal led Final-offer arbitration 









































12. This, of course is not a new idea, Korobkin, 
for instance discusses the option of a me-
diator offering direct evaluation of possible 
chances in litigation to the parties in a dis-
pute (2005, p.14).
13. We are not arguing per se that ODR tech-
nology is unbiased. Indeed the underlying 
system has the bias of its developer. But this 
is also a problem when relying upon books 
for advice or using the advice of experts. 
14. See Fogg for a broader discussion (2004, pp. 
121-177).
15. Best is a project of the members of the AI 
department and the Law faculty of the Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam.
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